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FOREWARD 
The original purpose of this research was to make a study of the 
iron and steel industry and its structure as a whole. However, the 
time and the data available were such that in this article the reference 
is made only to the iron and steel wholesalers and the study of the 
market in general is given as complementary. And the problem of iron 
and steel wholesalers is also such that a thorough study will require 
considerable time; so the survey of a few cases of wholesalers, chiefly 
of Osaka, is given as the basis of the present research. 
Before beginning the main article, mention must be made on the 
following points: 
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1. The prime objective of the present research is to study the 
changes in the structure of postwar wholesalers in comparison with the 
prewar wholesalers. (It is for this reason that in I is given the historical 
review of the transition of wholesalers.) 
2. As for special agents as a lower bracket of wholesalers, only 
a brief reference is made because of the insufficiency of the survey. 
3. The survey was made between the summer of 1950 and around 
March 1951 but it was suspended for a time. 
I. Transition of the Distribution Structure. 
(1) Before the inauguration of Governmentmanaged Yawata Iron 
Mfg. Co. 
This period was, as it were, a period of infancy of the iron and 
steel industry or a period of preparations for the opening of iron works 
in Japan. It was in the Meiji period (the first year of Meiji: 1868) that 
the demand for iron and steel began to increase: the railway construction 
between Tokyo and Yokohama was completed in 1872: the Miyako 
bridge in Yokohama was built in 1884 followed by other modern bridging 
works. But the production of iron and steel in Japan was still so small 
that the total output, both pig iron and steel combined, was not more 
than 5,000 tons in 1874. The production was still short of 20,000 tons 
as late as in 1894. Existing at that time were only a limited number 
of private manufacturers, army and navy steel mills and the Kamaishi 
Mine which occupied the majority of pig iron production. Chief among 
them were: 
1869: Gisaku Asaka reopened an iron foundry in an iron mine at 
Kamiyooka in the county of Iwaki It was transferred to Ono-
gumi in 1872. 
1882: The Navy established an arsenal at Tsukiji, Tokyo, with a 
Krupp-style crucible steel mill. 
1887: The Tokyo Steel Co. was established. 
1895: The Navy established a prOVisional steel mill at Kure. 
1899: Goshi Kaisha Osaka Steel Works was established. 
Wholesalers in Tokyo were in charge of marketing domestic iron 
produced in Chugoku, particularly Hiroshima, Shimane, Tottori and 
Okayama prefectures, which was sent to Tokyo through wholesalers 
in Osaka. Iron produced by Kamaishi Mine then known as Tanaka 
Mine was marketed by such wholesalers as Morioka, Yuasa, Umeoka and 
Asai who together with some other wholesalers, had organized the 
copper and iron wholesalers, had organized the copper and iron whole-
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salers union. At that time, there were the wholesalers unions ... formed 
in Tokyo and Osaka. Each kept to its own sphere, Tokyo chiefly 
handling imported iron and Osaka domestic iron. 
Note 1: Domestic iron was principally used for farming implements and kitchen utensils. 
Foreign trading was of course limited to import··· mainly from 
Belgium until around 1887. Wholesalers imported foreign steel (bar, 
plain and square) through the agency of .. Hikitoria" or middlemen expert 
in foreign language and with a fair knowledge about iron and steel, 
who On their part negotiated with iron and steel .. Bantos" of trading 
firms and contracted for import. That those engaging in foreign trade 
held by far a larger initiative in this case is proven by the facts that 
the weighing charge ... weighing was made at the time of delivery to 
assure the contracted amount··. had to be paid in full by the purchasers, 
that the trading with China was on cash basis, that the merchandise 
handled by those engaging in foreign trade occupied over 95 per cent 
of the merchandise handled by those engaging in domestic trade (see 
Table 1). 






For marine use I Total Trade 
I 
-
Export: 1874 106 I 18,796 415 19.317 
(1%) I (97%) (2%) (100%) I 
I 
1881 4,778 I 25.572 710 31,059 (15%) (82%) (3%) (100%) 
Import: 1874 75 22.128 1,259 23,462 
(1%) (94%) (5%) I 
(100%) 
1881 619 29,944 629 
I 
31,191 




Cf. Kiyoshi Matsui: .. Foreign Trade Of Japan" page 22. 
Figures shown above are not exclusive to iron and steel products but cover all kinds 
of exports and imports. 
The middlemen became independent traders as they increased their 
financial foundation. Iwasaki, ahead of all other middlemen, became 
independent in 1877 and subsequently grew so influential as to have 
all middlemen in Yokohama under his control. The middlemen were 
in their prime around this time. 
But the outbreak of the Sino·Japanese War and the ensuing rapid 
increase in the demand for iron and steel resulted in the formation of 
Teikoku Boeki Kaisha (" Imperial Tradmg Co. ") in 1899 for direct import 
of foreign merchandise. This caused a gradual decline of the middle-
men who before that time were in the key position in impOrt business. 
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Then Mitsui-gumi, OkurrJ,-gumi, Takada Shokai and Isono Shokai appeared 
in quick succession and began direct import, at last driving the middle-
men out of existence. 
Backed by the increased demand about the time the Sino-Japanese 
War broke out the production of iron and steel in Japan also began to 
increase gradually with the output in 1895 rising to more than twice 
the amount produced in 1878 though the production of steel materials 
was still 1,000 tons or so and the major part of demand had to be 
filled by imports (see Note 2). This resulted in Mitsui and other large 
importers taking advantage of their relatively big import capacity to 
meet the situation and eventually catapulting themselves to a key 
position in the iron and steel market··, a position which was once held 
by the middlemen. 
Note 2: Import from Britain of both pig iron and steel topped the list, other sources of 
supply having been Germany, Belgium, France, Sweden, etc. 
In short, the period before the inaUguration of Yawata Iron Mfg. 
Co., namely, the period of infancy for the Japanese steel industry was 
characterized by almost full dependence upon the import. Foreign 
traders were in a predominant position up to the middle of the Meiji 
Era and thereafter the Mitsui and other importers were in full control 
of the market. 
Literature: 
Motojiro Shiraishi: HTransaction in Iron and Steel." ("Lectures on Market" issue No.2) 
Steel Materials Club: H Book on Steel M alerials . ., 
(2) From the inauguration of Yawata to before the inauguration 
of Japan Iron Mfg- Co. 
1. It is generally admitted that the foundation of industrial capital 
in Japan was set around 1897. It seems to be no exaggeration to 
say that the inauguration of Government-managed Yawata Iron Mfg. 
Co. in 1901 marked an epoch in the history of the iron and steel 
industry in Japan. Or it may be more precise to say that the Japanese 
iron and steel industry entered into a modern stage with the inauguration 
of Yawata. 
In other words, the production of pig iron and steel materials which 
was 20,000 to 25,000 tons and around 1,000 tons, respectively, in 1900, 
namely, before the inauguration of Yawata (see Table 2) doubled to 
57,000 tons in pig iron and jumped up by more than six times to 
6,000 tons in steel materials in 1901, namely, after the inauguration 
of Yawata. The production further rose to 145,000 tOns and 90,000 tons 
in .1907 or seven times and as much as 90 times the production in 1900 
(see Table 3). That this big rise in pig iron and steel materials pro-
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Table 2: Production and Important of Iron and Steel 
(All given in ton) 
.. ~. 
Production Import 
Pig iron I Steel I materials Total 
Pig iron & I Steel & steel I 
ferroalloy materials Total 
. 
1893 16,074 808 16,882 23,285 36,342 I 86,627 
1894 81,126 1,208 18,334 36,649 89,607 126,256 
35,315 
, 
101,905 1895 24,663 1,064 25,727 
I 
157,220 
1896 26,122 1,192 27,314 39,036 191,299 230,335 
, 
I 1897 26,877 1,080 27,957 43,642 
207,444 , 251,086 
1898 22,480 1,100 23,580 63,402 
! 
228,832 I 292,234 
1899 20,752 908 21,660 27,244 I 120,080 I 147,324 
, 
I 1900 23,303 970 24,273 23,756 I 243,532 267,290 ; i 
Table 3: Production and Import of Iron and Steal 
(All given in ton) 
! Production I Import I , 
I Pig iron & I Steel 
I Total 
I Pig iron & I Steel & steel I Total 
I ferroalloy I materials ferroalloy materials 
1901 56,384 6,033 62,867 43,160 159,285 202,445 
1905 80,367 71,127 151,494 152,205 335,121 487,926 
1907 144,124 90,599 234,703 98,889 404,230 503,119 
1911 I 204,622 191,700 396,322 195,639 422,663 618,302 
1913 242,676 254,952 497,628 273,309 496,187 , 469,496 
1915 320,627 342,870 663,497 172,685 232,994 405,579 
1918 606,428 537,228 1,143,716 226,321 636,286 862,607 
1920 529,875 559,806 1,089,681 349,123 998,582 1,348,305 
1921 653,310 594,950 1,248,260 228,229 587,587 815,816 
1923 710,684 754,674 1,461,358 347,526 789,910 1,137,436 
1925 695,880 1,042,978 1,738,858 
I 
318,711 523,268 851,979 
duction was directly due to the inauguration of Yawata can be seen in 
Table 4. 
Yawata, which at the time of its inauguration already occupied 53 
per cent of the total pig iron production in Japan and 82 per cent in 
steel materials, predominated Japan's iron and steel production. Yawata 
expanded its influential position conspicuously toward the end of the 
Meiji period. In 1911, it came to occupy as much as 72 per cent and 95 
per cent of the nation's total production of pig iron and steel materials. 
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Table 4: Steel Production by Yawata !?'on Mfg, Co. 
(Given in ton) 
I 
i I National total(A) I Yawata's output (B) I (B)((A) I I 
._-
1901 6,033 4,956 I 82.1% 
I 1905 71,127 65,814 I 92.6 
1907 90,579 85,062 93.9 
1911 191,700 181,493 94.6 
1913 254,952 216,221 84.8 
1915 342,870 267,361 77.9 
1918 537,228 306,419 57.0 
1920 559,806 276,656 49.4 
1921 594,950 314,028 52.7 
1923 754,674 405,615 53.7 
1925 1,042,978 541,044 51.8 
On the other hand, the production of iron and steel in private 
channels was also encouraged by the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). 
The Kobe Steel Works was founded in 1905; the Wanishi Iron Works 
and the Japan Steel Works (by Anglo-Japanese joint capitalization) were 
founded in october 1907; the Okura-gumi started operation of its 
iron works at Penhsi-hu, China, in 1911; the Japan Steel Pipe was 
founded in 1912. But all these private manufacturers were not only 
much smaller in their production capacity and capital than Yawata but 
had no direct connection with Yawata in the way of production and 
marketing and the result was that they had to suffer a big pressure 
after Yawata began to sell its manufactures on the private market. 
Yawata at the time of its fOUnding, namely, before 1904 did not 
supply its products to the general private market but used most of its 
products for construction purposes in its own iron works. It was around 
1905 that Yawata began to sell its products on the general market. 
More than 10 private wholesalers, inclUding Kishimoto Shoten of Osaka, 
Morioka, Tsuda and Okura-gumi, became sales agents for Yawata. 
Toward the end of the Meiji period, Mitsui-gumi, Iwai and Ataka also 
became Yawata's sales agents and paved the way for their subsequent 
flourish as large wholesalers. 
Then came the panic of 1920 which, with an unprecedented sharp 
fall of iron and steel prices, caused many cancellations of contracts. 
Wholesalers were hit hard ... so hard that, even among the Yawata's 
sales agents, only those with big capital, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
I 
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l1vai and MO?ioka, could survive. And, among those of big capital, 
Mitmti, Mitsubishi, Iwai and Ataka were the Big Four which, as is 
mentioned later, at last organized a quadripartite special sales agent 
system for Yawata. Thus large wholesalers alone could supply Yawata's 
products to the general conSUmers although in the case of specific steel 
materials non·Big Four wholesalers and makers could have a direct 
contact with Yawata. 
Private iron and steel makers then gradually grew in number dUring 
the Taisho period, particularly dUring World War 1. Six private makers 
other than Japan Steel Works and Wanishi Iron Works with annual 
capacity of more than 5,000 tons were established during 1915, seven 
during 1916,11 during 1917 and six during 1918. The aggregate capital 
of the Japanese iron and steel industry more than tripled during the 
five years of the war. Thus Yawata, despite the continued increase of 
its production, began to show a decrease in the percentage of its pro-
dUction against the national total. As shown in Table 4, its production 
of steel materials, which occupied upwards of 90 per cent of the national 
total toward the end of the Meiji period, fell to around 50 per cent in 
and after 1918 and that of pig iron to the 40 per cent level. 
Despite this advancement of private makers, there was no direct 
connection as yet for marketing between these private makers and 
Yawata nor among private makers themselves. 
Thus it appears that the large wholesalers mentioned above who 
had established their predominant position by controlling minor whole· 
salers could have advantage in the market operation: they could capita· 
lize on the weak points of the private makers. It can also be considered 
that these large wholesalers who were concurrently importers could earn 
big profit by regulating at their will the marketing of domestic and 
imported products in due consideration of the fact that imports still 
continued to increase, though at a slower pace, to exceed domestic 
production (see Table 3). 
This predominance of the wholesalers over the makers (the whole· 
salers at this time also engaged in warehouse and financing business) tapered 
off as the sales structure of the makers became more and more mono-
polistic over the end of the Taisho period to the beginning of the Showa 
period. One thing which deserves special mention in this connection is 
that some of the large makers, such as Japan Steel and Mitsubishi Iron 
Mfg., were of the same line of capital as the large wholesalers. 
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2. From toward the end of Taisho period to the inauguration of 
Japan Iron Mfg. Co. 
It is a well-known fact that the iron and steel industry of Japan 
from the early stage had begun to develop as a monopolistic enterprise. 
But this can be said only natural when it is considered that capitalism 
in Japan··. militalistic in nature .. · had developed with wars from the 
very start. 
The move toward monopolization began to be seen when the 
privately managed iron and steel industry was on the rise, but it was 
in 1919 or the days of the Hara Cabinet that the question of Govern-
ment control of the iron and steel industry actually came to be con-
sidered with the establishment of an extraordinary financial and economic 
research council. This move was supported by both Government and 
industry circles as the iron and steel industry in the grip of depression 
after World War I was unable to make both ends meet. 
Seileo Konwa-kai (Steel Maker's Consultative Council) '" a cooperative 
organ among steel makers ... was thus established in December 1922 
with the aim of developing the steel industry. Then its colloraries were 
set up· .. Tekleo Kyogi-kai (Iron and Steel Makers Council) in December 
1925, Joleo Bunya Kyotei-kai (a council for agreement in the field of band 
steel production) in June 1926, and Sentetsu Kyodo Kumiai (Pig Iron Makers 
Cooperative) in July 1926 .. · laying the foundation for control of iron 
and steel production. 
All these control organs, despite their ultimate objective to realize 
the Government-industry collaboration, were actually the organs for 
autonomous cooperation among makers and their control function was 
none too strict. A real move toward a cartel system in the iron and 
steel industry can be said to have followed the establishment .of the 
Kanto Steel Materials Sales Union in December 1927. Since then, similar 
cooperative sales unions were set up one after another as a carteI-
patterned sales structure of the makers and almost 95 per cent of steel 
materials of domestic production were handled by these. cooperative sales 
unions. 
Prompted by the progress of this cartel system in the iron and steel 
industry the domestic production increased; so much so that it exceeded 
the import toward the end of the Taisho period and even jUmped up to 
more than twice the amount imported in the beginning of the Showa 
period (see T::;ble 5). The production by private makers also showed so 
big a progress that it overtook and then outran the output by Yawata 
(see Table 4) and, in 1930. the production of steel sheet by private makers 
ran up to almost twice the output by Yawata. (see Table 6) 
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Table 5: Production and Import of Iron and Steel 
(All given in ton) 
I 
I 
Production I Import 
I I I I Pig iron & I Steel I Total 
Pig iron & I Steel Total ferroalloy materials ferroalloy materials 
1926 936,868 1,256,302 2,193)70 403,695 948,116 1,351,811 
1927 1,040,205 1,415,121 2,545,326 478,002 890,192 1,368,194 
1928 1,255,786 1,720,489 2,976,275 571,902 899,482 1,472,384 
! 1929 1,266,064 2,033,880 3,299,944 657,263 941,004 1,598,363 
, 1930 1,338,015 I 1,919,290 3,257,305 408,579 967,651 905,344 
, 
1931 1,062,902 I 1,510,085 2,572,987 400,737 284,390 685,127 i 
Table 6: Comparison of Yawata's and 
Private Production of Non-Gilt Steel Plate 
(Given in ton) 
Yawata Private Note: Tables 2-6 so far shown 
are taken from "The Japanese Iron 
1926 178,369 113,518 and Steel Industry and Customs 
1927 180,739 168,721 Duties "(Author: the Economic 
1928 202,910 231,820 Research Institute, Oaska University 
1929 208,598 335,350 of Commerce.) 
1930 190,434 380,169 
1931 186,841 349,101 
The progress of domestic prodUction and the higher position of private 
producers naturally caused a change in the character of wholesalers 
who could have been in power because of undeveloped domestic production 
and weakness of private producers_ Wholesalers, who were compelled 
to sell at the prices fixed by the cooperative sales unions, became unable 
to profit from the price differential between domestic products and 
imported products. They also had to step down from the position 
where they could have a big gain by selling at high prices the iron 
goods obtained from Yawata on private contract (see Note 1). Thus the 
position of wholesalers generally had to be lowered as compared with 
the position of makers. 
Note 1: In 1917, 54 per cent of demand for Yawata's produCts were from Government 
sources and 4.6 per cent from private sources but the actual sales were 48 per cent to Govern-
ment sources and 52 per cent to private sources. In 1918 also, a similar situation was seen 
with the 37: 63 sales percentage despite the 52: 48 demand percentage. This shows how 
prOfitable the trade relations between Yawata and its affiliate large wholesalers were at that 
time. (Cl. The Iron and Steel Business Handbook 1951, page 5.) 
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This was particularly true in the case of medium and small whole· 
salers. Some of these medium and small wholesalers had to close down 
during the depression after World War I and even those who could 
survive were in no position financially to undertake large military 
construction works, such as the construction of Tokorozawa airbase. 
As the result, they had to lose their market and become subordinate 
to large wholesalers with big financial capacity. But after the large 
wholesalers were made sales agents designated by the makers' cooperative 
sales unions, medium and small wholesalers found it impossible to 
maintain direct contact with makers and could handle the makers' 
products only through large wholesalers designated as sales agents 
or their assistant wholesalers. 
Transactions through cooperative sales 
unions were made in the following manner: 
Yawata and each cooperative sales 
union met once or several times every 
month to fix spot and forward prices. 
Member companies (Yawata and private iron 
producers), designated sales agents and 
representative wholesalers of Tokyo, 
Nagoya and Osaka attended the meeting 
where the qUantity wanted by wholesalers, 
time of delivery, place of delivery, terms 
of payment, etc. were also determined and, 
according to the decision reached, whole· 
salers and designated sales agents entered 
into contract. Contracts were entered 
mainly on cash basis or with bills to be 
paid 60 days after fulfilment of the cont· 
ract. It seems the prices were quoted for 
10 kan· up to around 1928 but afterward 
for 100 kilograms. 
Distribution Structure at 
the Time of Establishment of 




Disignated Sales 1-Agents 
1 








Contracts between Yawata and wholesalers were entered at their 
option until around 1924 but, begining in 1925, forward contracts began 
to occupy as important a position as optional contracts (see Note 2) and 
then, after May 1927, the time contract system was adopted (see Note 3). 
Yawata, which was member of various cooperative sales unions from 
the start, followed the same way as private producers the sales method 
decided upon by each cooperative sales union but differed from the case 
of private producers in that it limited its designated sales agents to 
big four companies (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Iwai and Ataka) as a matter of 
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principle. 
List of Cooperative Sales Unions 
I Designated 
I I 
Date of Name 
I sales agent 
Members 
establishment 
Kanto Steel Big Four wholesalers Japan Steel Pipe, Nov. 1927 
Materials plus Fuji Steel Materi· Kamaishi Mine. Fuji 
als Steel, Azuma Steel 
Japan Black Big F.our wholesalers Yawata, Kawasalti Aug. 1930 
Plate Shipbuilding. Nakayama 
Steel, Tokuyama Iron 
Plate, Japan Steel 
Japan Wire Big Four wholesalers, I Yawata, Kobe Steel Oct. 1930 
Rod Japan Trading 
I 
Medium Plate Big Four wholesalers, i Yawata, Tokai Steel Oct. 1930 
Tokai Steel I 
Ferro-Alloy Mitsui, I Japan Steel Pipe, Dec. 1930 
: Mitsubishi Japan Soda, I 
I Tekkosha. Ogaki 
Electric Metallurgy, 
Daido Electric, 
, Kamaishi Mine 
Shikoku Hydraulic 
Power 
Japan Plate Big Four wholesalers Yawata, Kawasaki , Feb. 1931 
(seven other wholesal· Shipbuilding. 
ers also qualified for Asano Shipbuilding. i I edged steel sheet) Tokai Steel 
, 




Medium i Big Four wholesalers Yawata, Japan Steel, Mar. 1931 
I 
Angle Steel a I plus Morioka, Okatani, Tokai Ste(!i 
S. lto, M. Ito, 
I Kishimoto, Tsuda, I Yamamoto, Hirose , 
I 
As for the decision of prices. Yawata depended primarily upon orders 
from abroad until around 1931. This was to curb the otherwise inevit· 
able predominance of imported goods on the domestic market. This 
type of price fiXing, however, was replaced in due course by the method 
of fixing prices on the basis of demand and supply and market situation 
at home (see Note 4) as self-sufficiency in the iron and steel industry 
improved. (see Table 7) 
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Note 2: For forward contract, wholesalers and big four companies (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Iwai and Ataka) met once early every mouth to exchange views. Wholesalers gave. their 
orders to the fOllr companies which on their part reported them to Yawata and negotiated 
for the amount to be consigned for sales. Then the amount negotiated upon was allocated 
to the wholesalers. Only the four companies could negotiate, this forward contract with 
Yawata. 
Note 3: This system Was almost the same as the forward contract system. The only 
difference was that the amount to be consigned to the Wholesalers for sales was fixed. 
Note 4: The price fixing by private producers was based on that of Yawata. 
Table 7: Rate of Self-Sufficiency of Steel Materials 
(Including Special Steel) 
Production Import Total 
I _.---
1926 57.7 42.3 100 
I 1927 63.5 36.5 100 
1928 67.6 ~2.4 100 
1929 72.1 27.9 100 
1930 81.5 18.5 100· 
1931 63.8 13.7 100 
1932 90.0 10.0 100 
Compiled from surveys by the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry and Japan Iron and Steel Union. 
Table 8: Yawata han Mfg. CO.'s Sales Details (1928 to 1930) 
1928 1929. 1930 
Railway Ministry 135,322 ( 13%) 174,299 (17%.) 111,739 (13 %) 
Army Ministry 672 1,838 2,086 
. 
Navy Ministry 13,496 ( 1 ) 27,248 (3 ) 13,508 ( 1 ) 
at her Government 32,501 ( 3 ) 18,756 ( 2 ) 28,057 ( 3 ) 
circles 
Within YIMC itself 17,590 ( 2 ) 38,740 ( 4 ) 10,645 ( 1 ) 
Sub-total 199,580 ( 19 ) 260,881 (25) 166,035 (20) 
Iron merchants 719,941 (70) 607,045 (59) 532,805 (63) 
Shipbuilding industry 8,198 ( 1 ) 9,733 ( 1 ) 3,690 
Iron industry 91,699 ( 9 ) 141,169 (11) 107,814 (13) 
i Railways 825 596 30,502 ( 4 ) 
i Others 4,748 4,627 4,366 ( 1 ) 
I Suh·total 105,470 (10) 156,125 (15) 146,372 (17) I Total sales to private 825,411 ( 81) 763,170 (75) 679,177 (60) circles 
Grand total 1,024,991 (100) 1,024,051 (100) 845,212 ClOO) 
, 
Source: Annual Report for Steel Materials, 1931. 
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The improvement of self-sufficiency in the iron and steel industry 
served to drive out foreign merchants and, as the result, only a few of 
them stayed in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe to continue their business 
after the Showa period_ Most of the import was done by Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Iwai and Ataka as well as large wholesalers themselves, 
such as Iwamoto, Okatani and Morioka. 
The iron and steel industry and its distribution structure in Japan 
during the period from after Yawata's inauguration to before the establish-
ment of the Japan Iron Mfg. Co. can be summarized as follows: 
The first stage: Inauguration and development of the state-capitalized 
Yawata and its subsequent predominance, namely, the period in which 
the Japanese iron and steel industry laid the foundation of its future 
prosperity, private makers gradually made their headway, small whole-
salers declined and fell due to the post-World War I depression and 
large wholesalers strengthened their position by means of a close 
contact with Yawata. 
The second stage: Development of private makers and the rise of 
domestic production over the import; the cartelization of private makers 
with state-managed Yawata, resulting in the relative decline of whole-
salers. Namely, the advanced position of makers crystalized into the 
cartelization with Yawata made it inevitable for the wholesalers, who 
were concurrently engaging in financing business, to become commission 
merchants, as it were (see Note 5). Mention must be made, however, 
that some of the wholesalers (large wholesalers, of cource) were at the 
same time the makers. TheSe wholesalers merely shifted the weight 
of their business from that of a wholesaler to that of a maker, of 
which the typical example could be seen in the case of Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi. Okura and Asano lines also foIlowed suit. 
The character and the process of development of the Japanese iron 
and steel industry can be inferred from the following data: 









Japan Steel, Kamaishi Mine 
Mitsubishi Iron, Tokyo Steel 
Materials 
Sumitomo Steel, Sumitomo 
Shindo-Kokan 
Japan Steel Pipe, Asano Ship-
building, Tokai Steel, Asano-
Ogura Steel 
Okura Mining (Penhsi-hu) 
Fuji Steel 
Yawata, Toyo Iron, Kyushu 
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Note 5: While wholesalers were generally compelled to become commission merchants, 
some designated sales agents, such as Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji, continued to 
function as financing agents to the makers. 
Ii ter ature : 
Economic Research Institute, Osaka University of Commerce: "I ron a1td Steel I ndustr y 
and Customs Duty in Japan." 
"Iron and Steel Handbook "1951 Edition. 
(3) From the establishment of Japan Iron Mfg- Co. to the Pacific 
War. 
The speedy cartelization and the resultant concentration and cumu-
lation of production in the iron and steel industry was destined in the 
case of Japan to cause a close combination of the industry and the 
state authority, namely, the monopolization of the industry by the state. 
What intensified this trend was the overproduction in the iron and steel 
industry which began to be seen in 1930 and the consequent stagnation 
of production. 
In other words, the output of steel materials which amounted to 
more than 2-milion tons in 1929 declined to 1,900,000 tons in 1930 and 
1,600,000 tons in 1931; steel ingot output which was 2,300,000 tons in 
1929 and 1930 fell to 1,900,000 tons in 1931; pig iron production which 
rose from I-million tons in 1929 to 1,100,000 tons in 1930 decreased to 
900,000 tons in 1931. 
Strictly speaking, the move for the Government-industry tieup in 
the iron and steel field was already latent as early as in 1920's. It did 
not come to the fore until around 1933 due to the much smaller capacity 
of private producers, on the one hand, and the decline of military 
demand for iron and steel in consequence of the disarmament movement 
after World War I, on the other. (It is a destiny for the Japanese iron 
and steel industry to depend upon military demand to no small extent.) 
The time ripened for the state-industry combination as private 
producers steadily made their headway and large makers grew so influ-
ential as to hold their own against Yawata. At last, in 1934, the semi-
Governmental, semi-private Japan b·on Mfg. Co. was established (see 
Note 1). After the inauguration of the JIMC, the combination of state 
authority and monopolistic capital in the field of iron and steel production 
became more and more marked with the five-year plan for production 
increase for Japan and Manchuria getting underway in 1937 and the 
iron industry law enacted also in 1937. 
Note1: The Japan Iron Mfg, Co. was capitalized to 79 per cent by the state, to seven 
per cent by Mitsui, to 4.3 per cent by Mitsubishi besides other paid-up capital amounting to 
¥ 345,835,000. 
The collaboration of state authority and monopolistic capital 
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centering around the formation and management of the Japan Iron Mfg. 
Co. naturally resulted in stronger control in various phases of iron and 
steel production and. as the result. various cooperative sales unions 
were unified into the Japan steel Materials Sales Federation .. Designated 
sales agents came to be bound more strictly than before by the duty 
to observe the Federation-fixed prices. not to transact or import without 
approval of the Federation the same category of goods as were handled 
by the Federation or make speculative selling or buying of such goods 
on their own account. etc. 
This controlled distribution structure became even more strongly 
controlled with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937. as 
well as the enactment of the iron industry law in August 1937 and the 
adoption of an overall licensing system for the iron and steel industry 
to strengthen the national war setup. The Japan Steel Materials Sales 
Federation itself was reorganized in March 1928 into the Steel Materials 
Federation (see Note 2). 
Note 2: With the enforcement of the iron and steel supply control regulations in July 
1938, the coupon system was put into force. 
The Steel Materials Federation came into being as an autonomous 
control organ of the makers. proposed by the Iron and Steel Control 
Council which was established in February 1924 in the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry as an organ to regulate demand and supply of 
iron and steel on the basis of the Law for Emergency Measures for 
I 
Japan Steel Materials 1 
Federation 
Unions a 
Cooperative Sales I 
.--,-----------' 
-I Designated Sales Ib Agents 
Designated Whole· I~I salers 
Special Agents 1 d 
'------,-------
_I Consumers I-I 
'---------' 
a. The nine unions mentioned in the 
foregoing. 
h. Mitsui Bussao, Iwai, Ataka, Mitsubishi 
Shoji, Japan Trading, Japan Steel 
Materials, Asano Bussan, Okura Shoji, 
Takashimaya-lida, Japan Gas. 
c. The National Steel Materials Trade Union 
(later reorganized into regional steel 
materials supply organizations.) 
d. The Federation of Steel Materials Special 
Agents Unions. 
(Both wholesalers and special agents 
transacted with the consumers at the 
price inclusive of commission computed 
at the fixed rate.) 
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Exports and Imports. Cooperative sales unions were placed under the 
control of this Steel Materials Federation and the entire industry was 
forced to operate with rigid autonomous control according to the pre-
scribed amount of production and supply as well as selling prices. 
The above sales channel was simplified as designated sales agents 
lost their raison d'etre after the cooperative sales unions were reorganized 
into respective companies (see Note 3). 
Designated sales agents were then 
incorporated into wholesalers, while whole-
salers and special agents were also readjusted 
to become designated wholesalers and 
designated special agents of the new sales 
companies. 
Note 3: The Japan Steel Materials Sales Co. (Esta· 
blished: August 1939; Line of business: General steel 
materials, steel bar, steel shapes. steel plate, steel Wire.) 
The Steel Materials Sales Co., No.2 (Estahlished: 
December 1939; Line of business: Steel sheet, steel hoop, 
tin-plate.) 
The Japan Steel Pipe Sales Co. (Established: Dec' 
ember 1939.) 
State control of the iron and steel 
industry became more and more strict as the 
Sino-Japanese armed conflict continued to 
expand in scale; the Steel Materials Fede-









Consumers I I 
-' 
Steel Fecleration which in turn was reorganized into the Iron and Steel 
Control Association. 
With the establishment of the Japan Iron and Steel Federation in 
March 1940, the Japan Iron and Steel Materials Control Co., Japan Iron 
Waste Control Co. and Japan-Manchuria Iron and Steel Sales Co_ were 
unified into one organization to engage in the control of supply of iron 
and steel materials in accordance with the instructions from the Iron 
and Steel Federation's materials department and the sales companies 
mentioned above were designated as the Federation's supply control 
organs. As for consumption, the allocation system was adopted in 
which military demand was given top priority and the sales companies 
took charge of supply control by means of the coupon system, 
The Iron and. Steel Control Association came into being in April 
1941 as a result of the reorganization of the Iron and Steel Federation 
and was given a legal basis by the Important Industrial Organizations 
Ordinance in September the same year. It consolidated in one body 
the Iron and Steel Union (established in March 1938 primarily as a survey 
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organ) and the Japan Iron and Steel Federation as an integral part of 
the new economic structure based on the" composite planned economy" 
designed to complete the defense structure of the nation. 
Thus the iron and steel industry of Japan was in all its phases· .. 
producti.on, sales, prices, ete ... · placed under the Government control. 
As the result, the Iron and Steel Control Co., Ltd. was inaugurated in 
Decemeber 1941 replacing the aforementioned sales companies for unitary 
control of supply. The new company was designated in January 1942 
as a statutory supply organ and in cooperation with the control associ· 
ation took charge of supply control. 
During this while, wholesalers and sales agents also were either 
liquidated or reorganized. OUt of the 177 wholesalers which were in 
existence before that time, only eight survived as designated consignees 
which were direct sales depots of the sales control company (see Note 4) 
and 98 as designated wholesalers. Moreover, in July 1941, the distri· 
bution method was unified according to districts, categories and varieties 
of consumers. 
Note 4: Mitsui J Mitsubishi, Iwai. Ataka. Nissho, Asano and Okura were designated can-
signees. 
The Iron and Steel Sales Control Co., Ltd., was further scheduled 
to be incorporated into the control association but before the plan was 
realized the war was terminated. 
In short, the iron and steel industry in Japan gradually intensified 
its conversion to the wartime structure after the inauguration of the 
Japan Iron Mfg. Co.. The strengthening of control over the industry 
and, in turn, the distribution structure was such that wholesalers had 
to change their character and about the time the last war broke out 
even became a part of the wartime distribution structure. 
It must not be overlooked, however, that even under such circums-
tances there still remained a distinction among designated sales agents, 
wholesalers and special agents. In other words, the designated sales 
agents were, even after they were reoriented as general wholesalers, 
able to maintain their distinction from other wholesalers, etc., while 
. . 
special agents in most cases were compelled to cease functioning due 
to control and readjustment of the enterprise. 
literature: 
"Year Book on Control Associations", (1943 edition). 
Sasaki and Inomata: II PractIces of Iron and Seel Control . .. 
Sasaki and Inomata: II Practices of Iron and steel Control (Continued)." 
Kaichiro Tokiwa: .. Present Sialus of I yon and Sleel Induslry." 
ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION STRUCTURE IN THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRTY 65 
----- .... _----. -_.----_ .. ---_.-.-
Cooperative sales unio- ! 
DS for steel materials : I 
Japan Steel Materials I 
Sales Federation 
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'I Japan Steel Materials \ 
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tion : June 1938 
Materials Sales Co.; Japan Iron & Steel 
Japan Steel Pipe Materials Control Co. 
Sales Co. 
(Aug. 1939) 1 (Mar.1940) 
,-~------~~~------~~~ 
Japan Iron & Steel Federation 
.l (Mar.1940) 
Iron & Steel 
Union 
(Mar. 1938) 
Iron & Steel Control Assn. J ... -----I 
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... 1 1 ;-TJ""ap=-a-::n:---T:Ir=-=.o-.n.-&o-l Club Steel Assn. 
-(Dec. 1947) -(Dec. f947T-
--- --~---- , 
I 
Japan Iron & Steel 1 ... 1 
League! 
--'(Nov. 1948) 
( 4) From the end of war up to the present. 
The termination of the war on August 15. 1945, deprived the 
Japanese iron and steel industry of its military nature with which it 
had continued to develop from the start but, at the same time, relieved 
it out of the strong wartime control. The Iron and Steel Control 
Association as a wartime control organ was dissolved and in its stead 
the Japan Iron and Steel Council was established in February 1947 as 
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a liaison body for producers to regulate demand and supply during the 
period of confusion after the war. And under it were established liaison 
organs for various kinds of makers, such as the Japan Iron and Steel 
Union, Steel Materials Council, Pig Iron Council, Japan Cast Steel 
Asmciation and Japan Forged Steel Association. 
But, subsequently, due either to the Anti·Moncpoly Law or to the 
Economic Power Deconcentration Law, the Steel Materials Council was 
deactivated in December 1947 and in its stead the Steel Materials Club 
was established and the Japan Iran and Steel Union also was replaced 
by the new Japan Iron and Steel Union through the Japan Iron and 
Steel Association. This was in itself a process of decontrol and, therefore, 
of reversion to free trade. And this very fact afforded an opportunity 
for wholesalers (particularly medium and small wholesalers), which during 
the wartime had their function extremely crippled due to control or 
readjustment of enterprises and as the result were reduced to a mere 
portion of the distribution structure, to restore their intrinsic role as 
commercial capitalists. 
Despite the revival of whole· 
salers, production showed such 
a drastic decrease after the 
surrender that even in 1949 Or 
four years after the end of the 
war the output of steel materials, 
for instance, was still below 
half the output in 1942, virtually 
the year of the war's outbreak 
(See Table 9). This resulted in a 






















severe competition among wholesalers and, consequently, they had to 
follow the lead taken by makers, particularly large makers, though 
this situation in what it signified differed from the similar situation 
seen during the days of wartime control. The full background of 
this situation is exPlained later in this article but, anyway, this 
situation plus other circumstances made, it can be generally said, the 
wholesalers into modern commercial capitalists by handling products of 
the makers. 
But, with the easing of control after the war and the gradual return 
to free trade (though, before the complete reinstitution of free trade, trading 
was still subject to the allocation system administered by the Price Agency and 
the Price Adjustment Corporation using coupons or free coupons), production 
recovered and subsidy payment was also gradually reduced, paving the 
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Table 9 
(All given in ton) 
Domestic prcduction 
Steel materia13 I Pig iron I Steel ingot 
.-.-~ 
1936 4,548,112 2,007,571 5,223,017 
1937 5,080,022 2,308,541 5.201,036 
1938 5,485,535 2,563,043 6,471,506 
1939 5,381,188 3,178,602 6,696,210 
I 1940 5,261,110 3,511,940 6,855,663 
1941 5,046,447 4,172,710 6,844,359 
1942 5,050,966 4,256,348 7,643,768 
1943 4,809,573 4,032,268 7,630,245 
1944 4,147,539 3,156,974 6,728,588 
1945 1,153,769 977,020 1,271,681 
1946 426,254 208,422 557,188 
1947 635,969 343,584 952,113 
I 1948 
1,200,801 808,024 1,714,676 
I 1949 2,473,000 1,684,000 3,362,000 
I 1950 3,466,485 2,232,911 4,838,522 
(Japan Iron and Steel Union's Survey) 
way toward eventual resumption of private foreign trade. But, on the 
other hand, the industry had to suffer a depression due to the world· 
wide decline of iron and steel prices in 1949 which· cynically came 
before the question of high production cost was solved (see Table 10). 
This setback, however, could be overcome at least for a while with 
the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 which was accompanied 
by the rearmament trend among capitalist nations of the world and 
the concomitant war boom bringing up the iron and steel prices on the 
world market. 
This resulted in the return of business with increased exports but, 
at the same time, complaints began to be heard among medium and 
small wholesalers, particularly those who were not engaging in exPort 
business, over what was called the oppression of domestic demand. A 
confrontation temporarily ensued between large wholesalers and small 
wholesalers but this confrontation is now not as sharp as it was. 
It is yet to be seen how the Japanese iron and steel industry will 
be affected in the future by the truce talks in Korea and the ban on 
trade with the communist-controlled Chinese mainland. 
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Table 10: Production, Stocks and Balance of Sales on Credit of 
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(Source: Steel Materials Club Information, Nos. 50 and 60.) 
Note: Attention is called to the sharp upcurve of the 
balance of sales on credit from December 1949 
and also to its fall in June 1950 after the outbreak 
of the Korean War. 
Table 11: Iron and Steel Price Moves in Belgium 
(Unit: $ ) 
1950 
Apr. May Jun. Ju!. Aug. Sept. Oct. 
Steel bar 16% 52 52 52 56 61 80 
Steel Shapes 75/~ x 75~% 53 53 53 59 64 75 88 
Steel plate 12j~ X 25j,;, 62 62 62 65 78 80 110 
Steel sheet 0.5% 119 119 119 120 125 115 ll5 
Note: In Belgium where iron aud steel prices are said most sensitive to the world 
situation, the price rises after the outbreacl{ of the Sino-Japanese armed 
conflict are particularly noticeable. 
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II. Actual Situation Of Postwar Distribution Structure And Its Various 
Problems. 
( 1) General Review 
1. Wholesalers And Agents 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Iwai, 
which had been distinguished from other wholesalers before the war 
as designated merchants or designated sellers, became ordinary whole· 
salers, having been deprived of their privileged position by wartime 
control. . Acting as consignees, they barely maintained their position in 
the upper stratum of the distribution structure of the seIling control 
company. 
After the war there has been no distinction among wholesalers, 
at least in form, aside from their difference in economic or traditional 
strength. 
The only distinction that remains, if any, is that between whole-
salers and agents. It is not easy, however, to tell one from the other 
in the strict sense of the term, for considerable numbers of both whole-
salers and agents additionally carry out each other's business. 
Be that as it may, the existing wholesalers and agents may be 
defined as follows: 
Wholesalers: Being qualified to deal directly with makers, they 
have comparatively large economic power_ Direct supply is made by 
them only to major customers. Minor or out-of-the-way customers 
are supplied through agents. 
Agents: Agents are retailers. They do not deal directly with 
major makers. Doing business through wholesalers, they deal with 
customers as the wholesalers' substructure_ The customers with whom 
they deal are all minor ones. 
To point out a few more characteristics that distinguish one from 
the other, wholesalers investigate the supply and demand situation of 
iron and steel for the convenience of the makers. When necessary they 
make a financial sacrifice for makers, customers or agents, in order to 
smooth out the supply and demand situation. Agents have almost no 
such obligation_ Both wholesalers and agents have storehouses at 
specific places, the former having comparatively large ones and the 
latter comparatively small ones suitable to their respective business. 
Wholesalers' storehouses are no more than places for keeping their 
goods because they are engaged mostly in business with major customers 
and therefore keep goods already contracted for as a ruk (Note 1). 
70 S. SUZUKI 
On the other hand, the storehouses of agents, which deal in small 
amounts of goods and therefore earn only small commissions, look more 
like places for a display of goods for sale than storehouses. This 
difference, however, is not c1earcut, there being many exceptions. 
Note 1: The proportion of goods already contracted for in the total of goods on hand 
differs considerably at different times according to market conditions. 
The following diagram shows the present iron and steel distribution 
system in which wholesalers and agents act as media between makers 
and customers: 
(A) indicates direct sales by 
makers to customers such as sales 
to the National Railways. In 
Japan, instances of direct sales are 
comparatively few, accounting for 
only 10 to 25 per cent of the total 
ship:nents. Sales through whole· 
salers, which are marked (B) in the 
diagram, occupy the remaining 75 
to 90 per cent. Of these the sales 
through agents are less than 10 per 
cent and are limited to trans· 
actions with domestic customers. 
The remainder is the direct supply 
from wholesalers to customers 
(both domestic and foreign). 
As of March 1950 there were 
174 wholesalers most of whom 








: I Agents 
Customers 
(domestic and foreign) 
Contract·······'··--;lo 
Selling . ------> 
as well as the National Association of Iron and Steel Wholesalers. The 
agents numbered 1,154, or about six times as many as the wholesalers. 
They were located in various parts of the country, whereas the wholesalers 
were concentrated in major cities, mostly Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. 
The proportion of wholesalers to agents increased after the war. 
Although there were 31 agents to each wholesaler in 1937, the pro· 
portion was six to One in April 1949. 
A breakdown of the ship;nents of ordinary steel materials during 
1950 follows: 
Total shipments 
Direct sales by makers 
. Sales through wholesalers 
Direct sales by Wholesalers 
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Note: (1) In the above table II sales through agents" actually include all sales to 
other dealers. The actual amount of sa1es through agents must, therefore, be somewhat 
smaller than the given figure. 
(2) The above table is based on data of the Kozai Club. 
2. Method of Transactions 
After the war the Designated Producer Goods Quota Regulations 
were enforced. According to the regulations, the customers presented 
data to the Economic Stabilization Board through competent Govern-
ment offices. The Economic Stabilization Board, after consulting with 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Present Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry), notified the competent Government offices of the 
distribution plan. The competent Government offices in turn issued 
distribution tickets to customers according to the distribution plan. 
The customers placed orders with wholesalers on the basis of the 
distribution tickets and the wholesalers concluded contracts with manu-
facturers. The tickets were collected upon delivery of the products. 
Inasmuch as the Government was subsidizing the production of iron 
and steel, all purchases and buying back were carried out by the iron 
and steel department of the Price Adjustment Public Corporation. 
This postwar method of transactions was later partly revised and 
in April 1949 a free coupon system was adopted .. 
The free coupon system was not much different from its predecessor 
in proceedings or in form, the only difference being that the tickets were 
restored to their issuers. It did have, however, the effect of introducing 
factors of free competition in the transactions as the makers vied with 
each other trying to secure the tickets. 
As to wholesalers' commissions, the system was changed in September 
1949. making the wholesalers receive commissions directly from makers. 
whereas up to then they had been receiving commissions from the 
public corporation with the makers having nothing to do with the 
commission. 
With the smooth increase of prodUction thereafter the steel materi-
als subsidy was abolished in July 1950 and the pig iron subsidy and the 
official price system were abolished in April 1951. marking the resto-
ra tion of free transactions. 
An outline of the method of transactions now in force follows: 
Holding futUres transactions conferences once or several times every 
month, the makers announce prices and at the same time consult with 
wholesalers about contracts. There are three kinds of contracts: 
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Table 13: Distribution of 






















































































(1) Time contract: 
Makers enter into contracts 
with specific wholesalers (not 
all but usually specific ones) for 
the purchase of a fixed amo-
unt of products at regular 
intervals during the period of 
contracts. This method is not 
advantageous to the whole· 
salers when the market quo· 
tations move violently. 
( 2) Futures contract: 
With the iron and steel supply 
and demand situation in view, 
wholesalers enter into cont· 
racts with makers for the 
purchase of products to be 
delivered one or two months 
later. This method is often 
adopted when the market is 
on the upswing. 
( 3) Free contract: 
Wholesalers enter into cont· 
racts with makers whenever 
they want to place orders. 
Simultaneous with the 
delivery of products to the 
customers or after a fixed 
period, the wholesalers receive 
payments from the customers 
. either in cash or in draft. At 
the end of 1950, 10 per cent 
of the transactions were paid 
for in cash, 20 per cent In 
two·month draft, 30 to 40 per 
cent in three·month draft, and 
30 to 40 per cent in four· 
month draft. 
The two last named 
methods were mostly applied 
























(not including branches and sub-branches. 
As of April 1950) 
Note: (1) Wholesalers are members of the 
Kozai Club. 
(2) The number of agents is based on 
investigation by the National Asso-
ciation of Iron and Steel Whole-
salers (as of December 1949) 
to major customers of good 
credit standing. 
The commissions receiv· 
ed by wholesalers were con· 
tained in the official prices 
paid by the customers during 
the period of postwar control. 
But after the removal 
of control the commissions 
have become different in rate 
as the different makers adopt 
different methods of pricing. 
For instance, the Ya· 
wata and Fuji Iron Manu· 
facturing Companies include 
the wholesalers' commissions 
in their selling prices, but they 
adopt different pricing methods 
for tin plate and steel materials and for selling at their plants and link 
system selling. 
The Kawasaki Iron Manufacturing Company, on the other hand, 
does not include the commissions in its selling prices. The commissions 
therefore vary according to market conditions without any direct con· 
nection with the selling prices. 
The ordinary rate of commission at present is three per cent, 
though rates other than this are also in existence .. 
The method of not including the commission in the selling price is 
generally advantageous to the wholesalers, particularly with regard to 
the futUres contracts. It, however, also involves risks to the wholesalers. 
The method of including the commission in the selling price involves 
less risks as far as the commission is concerned, but the chances are 
smaller for netting hUge profits because the commission is fixed. 
( 2) Actual conditions of wholesalers and various problems 
1. New wholesalers' advance and old wholesalers 
With the removal of wartime control after the war, a steady revival 
was made by wholesalers and by 1950 their number came to almost 
equal the total just before the outbreak of the war. Especially note· 
worthy in the postwar increase of wholesalers was the advance made 
by wholesalers newly established after the war. 
Of the 336 wholesalers capitalized at more than Y I-million which 
existed in 1950, 170, or more than one half, were postwar establishments. 
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(cf. Table 14). 
As a notable feature, the increase of first-class wholesalers capita-
lized at more than ¥ 10-million and first-class agents capitalized at over 
¥l-million was especially remarkable, the latter increasing nearly 200 
per cent_ 
There are some problems connected with the reason for the increase 
of first-class wholesalers. The increase of first-class agents is attributed 
to a reaction to the fact that firms capitalized at around ¥ I-million 
were hardest hit by the enterprise readjustment under wartime control, 
and also to the sharp decrease of munitions demand and the comparative 
increase of civilian demand after the war. 
Table Ii: Development of new wholesalers (1950) 
Date of establishment 
Capital Before t he end of 
! After t he end of war 
Total 
World War II 
Over ¥ 10·million 14 13 27 
.. ¥ 5-million 23 12 35 
" 
¥ 3·million 27 17 44 
.. ¥ 2·million 35 28 63 
" 
¥ I-million 67 100 167 
Total 166 170 336 
The development of new firms was a trend also seen among whole-
salers engaged in the export business. The trend became conspicuous 
along with the increase in iron and steel export. For instance, whereas 
there were only six postwar exporters in 1948, the number jumped to 
49 in the following year, accounting for 40.1 per cent of the total 
export business as compared with 14.5 per cent in 1948. 
Thus the old wholesalers relatively retreated and new ones advanced, 
putting an end to the absolute control of the market by the less than 
10 old major wholesalers which had formerly handle more than 90 per 
cent of the iron and steel business in the country. 
It is worthy of note, however, that the growth of new wholesalers 
did not develop to such an extent as to complete on even terms with 
the old ones. For instance, I1Vai. Irimaru and other old major whole-
salers occupied the first 10 places in the amounts of purchases dUring 
1949. Though two new postwarfirms,Muromachi Bussan and Marunouchi 
Shoji, were among the big 10, they were none other than successors to 
the now-defunct Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji as can seen from 
the following data: 
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Date of liquidation 
Firms established after 
liquidation 
Shares disposed of 
l?ercentage to total inumber 
a ( shares in possesssion 
Disposal price 
(As of July 31, 1948) 
--- -- .. _--._---- ------_. _._ .. ----_._---
Mitsui Bussan Mitsubishi Shoji 













¥ 10·m illion 
If the Marunouchi Shoji and the Muromachi Bussan are classified 
as old wholesalers, all the first places in the amounts of purchases were 
held by old wholesalers. Their purchases accounted for nearly 45 per 
cent of the total. (cf. Table 15) 
In the export of iron and steel, the successors to the Mitsui BU8san 
and the Mitsubishi Shoji accounted for 21.9 per cent and 14.0 per cent, 
respectively, their combined total being 35.9 per cent. 
Their shares in the export business of newly established export 
firms were: the Mitsui successor 52.8 per cent and the Mitsubishi suc· 
cessor 33.8 per cent, their combined total being 86.6 per cent. Thus 
their positions in the iron and steel business cannot be underestimated. 











Okay a Kotetsu 
Nankai Kogyo 
Total 
Nippon Tekko and 31 others 
133 other medium and small 
wholesalers 


















(Source: Data of the Koza; Club) 




(42 firms) 100% 
(175 
firms) 
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The development of new firms was especially remarkable among 
small wholesalers and agents capitalized at about ¥1-million. The 
same is generally true with major wholesalers as well but it appears 
that the old wholesalers continue to hold a position superior to the 
new ones. 
The business handled by the firms whose capital is less than ¥ 1-
million each was no more than 7.8 per cent. 
2. Analysis of wholesalers' enterprises 
A. Relations between owned capital and borrowed capital 
Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, as well as the loss of munitions 
and overseas colonial markets, dealt a severe blow to the wholesalers' 
capital, especially fixed capital. 
hvai Shoten, for instance, lost all its 49 branches and sub-branches 
abroad, suffering a loss of ¥ 20-million' in overseas property. Ataka 
Sangyo, too, lost ¥ 30-million worth of overseas property (as compared 
with its' authorized capital of ¥ lO-million at that time). 
The effect of defeat in war and shortage of capital was seen most 
conspicuously in the comparative decrease of owned capital as against 
borrowed capital. 
As seen in Table 16 the owned capital of the Ataka Sangyo, which 
was about one-eighth of the others' capital before the end of the war, 
showed a sudden decrease after the war to one-fortieth to one-forty-fifth. 
Tadle 16: Comparison of owned and borrowed capital 
(Ataka Sangyo) 
Sept. 30 Sept. 30 
I 1944 1945 
Own capital I 11.3 13.0 
Others' capital i 89.7 87.0 
Total i 100 100 ! 















Analysis of Ataka Sangyo's accounts shows that there was a sharp 
decrease after the war in reserve funds. Although the employees' 
retirement allowance reserve alone increased to 15.1 per cent in the 
first half of 1946 from 6 per cent during the war (1944), it too decreased 
thereafter to 8.3 per cent in the first half of 1949 and 5.4 per cent in 
the first half of 1950, or smaller than the wartime percentage. 
The increase of other's capital, on the other hand, is largely due 
to the heavy increase in loans and accounts payable. 
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Table 17: September 30, 1949 to March 31, 1950 
(Unit, ¥ 1,000) 
Muromachi Bussan Marunouchi Shoji Ataka Sangyo 
Amount I % Amount I % Amount 
I 
I % 
Loans 393,000 31.7 14,500 0.9 531,799 20.4 
Accounts 478,942 38.6 516,721 32.3 1,060,153 40.6 payable 
Others 367,309 29.7 1,072,801 66.8 1,015,204 39.0 
Total, borrowed 1,239,251 100 1,604,022 100 2,607,156 100 capital I 
The loans, which were almost nil before and during the war, came 
to occupy 20 to 30 per cent in all companies as seen in Table 17. 
Note: Although the loans of the Marunouchi Shoji were conspicuously small, it was a 
temporary phenomenon in that particular period (September 1949 to March 1950). At other 
times they occupied 10 to 20 per cent of the other's capital as in the case of other companies. 
The increase of loans reflects the dearth of wholesalers' owned 
capital after the war and their increased dependence on bank capital. 
It may also be necessary to mention here that most of the loans 
of all wholesalers are by short·term bills of 30 to 60 days' maturity. 
The loans are extended, of course, by banks. The number of 
banks from which the wholesalers borrow money generally increased 
after the war. 
I Name of Wholesaler I 
I Amount Date I Creditors 
I I of loans I 
I Muromachi Bussan I Teikoku Bank and 11 other hanks 863,627,000 March 1951 ¥ 
Iwai Sangyo June 1949 Tokyo Bank and eight other banks ¥ 412,922,000 
Marunouchi Shoji Feb. 1951 Chiyoda Bank and four other banks ¥ 408,412,000 
Ataka Sangyo Sept. 1950 Osaka Bank and 11 other banks ¥ 745,721,000 
The accounts payable suddenly increased after the war, occupying 
30 to 40 per cent of the others' capital in the balance sheets of all 
wholesalers. Parallel with the increase of accounts payable, the accounts 
receivable also 'increased, the latter being usually larger than the former. 
Though the wholesalers faithfully dispose of the accounts payable, 
the accounts receivable cannot be cashed in so smoothly. Sales on 
credit are incomparably larger than cash sales. For instance. 70 to 80 
per cent of the sales by the Marunouchi Shoji are on credit. 
However, in the case of makers (that is, second-class makers other than 
the Big Five) there are more accounts payable than accounts receivable. 
Only 10 to 20 per cent of the sales are on credit as seen in the case 
of the Amagasaki Seiko. 
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This fact shows that the wholesalers are makers to maintain a 
normal capital rotation by shouldering the burden arising from the 
unbalance between sales on credit and buying on credit. 
b. Distribution of shareholders and its changes 
It is said that, generally speaking, in Japanese joint stock companies 
a small number of shareholders possess the bulk of shares. This is 
exactly the case with the Yawata and Fuji Iron Manufacturing Co.s, 
the" Big Two" in the Japanese iron and steel industry. 
In the Yawata Iron Manufacturing Co. 0.3 per cent of the share· 
holders possess 62.8 per cent of the total stock, while in the Fuji Iron 
Manufacturing Co. 0.2 per cent of the shareholders possess 54 per cent. 
The high degree of concentration in the possession of shares reflects 
the general characteristic of monopolistic capital in Japan where a small 
number of monopolistic capitalists control enterprises. 
However, in the case of wholesalers who form a wing of the system of 
Table 18: Accounts receivable, accounts payable and 
how they are settled. 
(October 1950 to March 1951) 
Accounts Sums Rate of I Accounts Sums Rate of 
receivable settled settlement payable settled settlement 
A B BIA , AI B' B'IA' 
Marunouchi I Shoji 
Oct. 1,643,158 598,414 36.4% 1,180,207 546,221 47.9% 
Nov. 1,612,842 541,616 33.6 1,127,105 532,187 47.2 
Dec. 1,706,797 648,300 38.0 1,215,008 574,341 47.3 
Jan. 1,705,875 621,625 36.4 1,263,115 593,630 36.9 
Feb. 1,666,734 586,962 35.0 1,324,267 671,073 50.7 
Muromachi 
Bussan 
Oct. 1,992,350 1,010,468 53.0% 1,459,088 853,778 60.0% 
Nov. 2,056,686 1,039,116 51.0 1,600,367 919,473 57.0 
Dec. 2,444,268 1,472,338 60.0 2,070,793 1,320,071 64.0 
Jan. 2,348,181 1,227,960 52.0 1,966,984 1,295,352 66.0 
Feb. I 2,910,522 1,648,771 55.0 .2,083,156 1,282,533 62.0 
market control by monopolistic capital, the situation is somewhat different. 
Needless to say, even fiest-class wholesalers have a much smaller 
amount of capital and a much smaller number of shares than in the 
case of manufacturers. In this sense they are equal at best to second-class 
manufacturers. But this very fact has caused the degree of concentration 
in share possession to be lower than in the case of manufacturers, 
showing a typical characteristic of Japanese industry. 
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Note: In Japan there often is the phenomenon that the larger the enterprise the higher 
is the degree of concentration in share possession and vice versa. For instance, the degree 
of share concentration in the Amagasaki Steel Works, whose capital is smaller than that of 
the Yawata or Fuji, is considerably lower than that of these two companies. Shareholders 
possessing more than 10,000 shares each are 1.8 per cent of the total. The total number 
of shares in their possession is equivalent to 57.5 per cent of the entire stock. 
To cite the example of the Marunouchi Shoji and the Muromachi 
BU88an, both of which are first-class wholesalers, shareholders of the 
Marunoudhi Sooji possessing more than 10,000 shares each, who account 
for 1.2 per cent of the total nUalber of shareholders, own only 12 per 
cent of the entire stock (even in this case the degree of concentration is 
considerably higher than in older capitalistic countries such as the United 
States), while the holders of 1,000 to 5,000 shares each, who occupy 37 
per cent of the total number of shareholders, possess the majority of 
shares. 
The degree of concentration is a little higher in the case of the 
Muromachi BU88an in which the holders of more than 5,000 shares each, 
who account for 6.5 per cent of the total number of shareholders, possess 
47.3 per cent of the entire stock. Even then the degree of concentration 
is incomparably lower than that of Yawata or Fuji. 
The lower degree of share concentration in the case of wholesalers 
than in the case of manufacturers may mean that the democratization ( ? ) 
in the possession of shares 'has progressed further in the case of whole-
salers than in the case of manufacturers. This trend gradually asserted 
itself in the period around the end of the war. Table 21 on the changes 
in the possession of shares of Ataka Sangyo from before to after the 
war shows how the degree of share concentration became gradually 
lower. 
Table 19: Concentration of share possession (manufacturers) 
Yawata b'on Manufacturing Co. 
No. 01 No. of shares Proportion of(A) I Proportion 01 (B) 
No. of shares shareholders in possession to total number j to total number 
(A) (B) of shareholders of shares 
Ove-r 100,000 28 10,054,£00 0.3% 62.8% 
• 50,000 15 1,007,930 0.1 6.3 
<- 10,000 77 1,898,780 0.6 11.9 
<- 5,000 51 219,070 0.4 1.4 
<- 1,000 413 691,550 3 4.3 
Less than 1,000 12,640 2.128,070 95.6 13.3 





(January 30, 1951) 
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Fuji Iron Manufacturing Co. 
I 
No. of No. at shares Proportion of (A) Proportion of (B) 
No. of shares shareholders in possession to total Dum ber to total number 
CA) (B) of shareholders of shares 
Over 100,000 20 4,338,950 02 % 54% 
.. 50,000 8 516,400 0.08 6 
.. 10,000 67 1,319,000 0.6 16 
.. 5,000 35 209,450 0.3 3 
.. 1,000 348 453,370 3 6 
Less than 1,000 10,695 1,162,830 95.8 16 
Total 11,173 8,000,000 100 100 
(January 30, 1951) 
Source: Debenture issue plan. 
Table 20: Concentration of share possession (wholesalers) 
Marunouchi Shoji 
No. of No. of shares Proportion of (A) I Proportion at (B) 
No. of shares shareholders in possession to total number to total number 
(A) CB) of shareholders of shares 
Over 10,000 4 47,967 1.2% 12.0% 
.. 5,000 12 70,436 3.5 17.6 
.. 1,000 125 223,075 . 36.7 55.8 
.. 500 46 28,211 13.5 7.1 
.. 100 130 29,111 38.1 7.2 
Less than 100 24 1,200 7.0 0.3 
Total 341 400,000 100 100 
(January 30, 1951) 
Source: Capital increase plan. 
Muromachi Bussan 
No. of No. of shares Proportion of (A) Proportion of ( B) I 
No. of shares shareholders in possession to total number to total Dum ber 
CA) (B) of shareholders of shares 
Over 10,000 16 262,900 2.2% 
I 
26.3% 
.. 5,000 32 210,150 4.3 , 21.0 
.. 1,000 180 396,250 24.5 
I 
39.6 
.. 500 110 61,850 15.0 6.2 
.. 100 376 67,900 51.3 6.8 
Less than 100 19 950 2.7 i 0.1 
Total 733 1,000,000 100 I 100 
(March 31, 1951) 
Source: Capital increase plan. 
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Table 21: Changes in the distribution of share possession 
of Ataka Sang yo 
(Based on its business report) 
September 30, 1945 
Over Over Over Over 
10,000 5,000 1,000 ::00 
shares shares shares shares 
No. of ShareholdersCA) 1 3 14 9 
Over Less 





No. of shares in their 118,350 19,600 37,770 5,760 13,180 5,340 200,000 possession CB) 
Proportion of CA) to 
total Dumber of share- 0.36% 1.07 4.98 3.20 23.41 66.90 100 
holders 
Proportion of CB) to 59.18% 9.80 18.89 2.88 6.59 1 2.67 100 total number of shares 
March 31, 1949 
Over Over Over Over Over Less 
10,000 5,000 1,000 500 100 than Total 100 shares shares shares shares shares 
sbares 
No. of shareholdersCA) 10 ·3 40 I 50 325 55 483 I 
No. of shares in their 275,100 18,570 96,220 34,720 73,500 1,840 500,000 posseSSion CB) 
Proportion of CAl to 
total number of share· 2.07% 0.62 8.28 10.35 6729 11.39 100 
holders 
Proportion of CB) to 55.00% 3.71 19.24 6.94 14.71 0.37 100 total number of shares 
September 30, 1950 
Over Over Over Over o I Less ver th 
10,000 5,000 1,000 500 100 an Total 
shares shares shares shares shares I share~OO 
No. of shareholders CAl 10 8 86 142 240 I 10 964 
No. of shares in their 
posseSSion CB) 162,350 47,700 133,700 89,650 66,110 1 490 500,000 
Proportion of CA) to 
total number of share- 2.01% 1.61 17.34 28.63 48.31 2.0l 100 
holder 
Proportion of CB) to 32.47% 9.54 26.74 17.93 13.22 0.1 100 total number of shares 
As to the changes of shareholders, major wholesalers of long standing 
show a strong trend toward individualistic management. Both in Ataka 
Sangyo and Iwai Sangj/o the shares in the possession of the members 
of the Ataka and Iwai families had always been in the upper bracket. 
Among the other shareholders, too, there many individuals, 
The reason why this tendency long continued is becam;e, as men· 
tioned before, the wholesalers had less capital than the manufactUrers. 
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Mter the war the destruction' of capital and the unprecedented 
inflation made capital so scarce that individual capital alone could not 
meet the requirements. Thus of necessity the possessors of capital 
changed from individuals to banks and other juridical persons. 
Take for instance the case of Ataka Sangyo (see Table 22) Banks, 
insurance companies and other financial organs gradually increased among 
its shareholders after the war, whereas individual3 were predominant 
dUring the war. 
The same tendency is seen also in the case of the Muromachi 
Bussan shown in Table 23. 
These facts show the insufficiency of individuals' assets to cover 
capital increase as well as the advance of banks, insurance companies 
and other financial organs in the capital ownership of wholesalers. 
I 
I 
Table 22: Changes in shareholders of the Ataka Sangyo 
(Based on capital increase and business reports) 
September 31, 1945 









(Total number of shares: 200,000) 
December 23, 1948 
Name of shareholder 

































(Note) Capital increase on November 1948 
(Total number of shares: 500,000) 
I Proportion against the 









Proportion against the 
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I 
September 30, 1950 
Name of shareholder No. of shares in Proportion against the possession lolal number of Shares 
Ata'K3 Kyosaikai 26,850 5.37% 
Bank of Osaka, Ltd. 25,000 5.00 
Tokyo Marine & Fire Insura- 25,000 5.00 nce Co., Ltd. 
Eiichi Ataka 20,000 4.00 
Masakichi Kanda 13,000 2.60 
Kyutaro Isaki 11,500 2.30 
Senkichi Kuroda 11,000 2.20 
Nippon Life Insurance Co. 10,000 2.00 Ltd. 
Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. 10,000 2.00 
03aka Sumitomo Marin & 10,000 2.00 Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. 
(Note) same as above. 
Table 23: Major shareholders of the Muromachi Bussan 
Name of shareholder No. of shares 
Bank of Tokyo 45,000 
Taisho Marine & Fire 31,500 Insurance Co. 
Chua Life Insurance Co. 31,100 
Teikoku Bank 17,500 
Kakumaru Securities Co. 15,200 
Sakura Special Steel Rolling 15,000 Co. 
Tashiro Hiroshima 14,500 
Takao Kuranishi 11,500 
Suekic hi Shiina 11,400 
Seijiro Mizukarni 10,200 
Total number of shares: 1,000.000 (March 31, 1951) 
Based on t he capital increase plan 
c. Relations between profits and labour wages 
Proportion to total 











With the intensification of the Pacific War the rate of wholesalers' 
profits gradually decreased. It registered an abrupt fall immediately 
after the war. 
When the wholesalers began to revive, the rate of profits also 
started an upward march. It made a remarkable ir:crease after the 
abolition of the control on steel materials and the commencement of 
free transactions in July 1950. being spurred by the special procurement 
demand and business upswing in connection with the Korean War. 
I 
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The business improvement had its effect on the rate of dividend 
to shareholders as well. Maruwuchi Shoji, for instance, which paid 
no dividend from the end of war up to March 1949, began paying a 
dividend of 10 per cent per annum in April 1949 and increased the 
rate to 20 per cent per annum in April 1950. 
Table 21; Change in the rate of net p:·ofits 
(Ataka Sangyo) 
Rate of net profits 
Profits x2 
Capital 
April 1, 1944-September 30, 1944 47.7% 
April 1, 1945-September 30, 1945 3.6 
April 1, 1946-August 10, 1946 68.4 
April 1, 1949-September 30, 1949 99.6 
April 1, 1950-September 30, 1950 484.9 
Table 25: Change In the relation between net profits and 
capital (Muromachi Bussan) 
i Rate of net profits 
Net profits 
Capital 
October 1949-March 1950 423.9% 
April 1950-Septemher 1950 795.1 
Octoher 1950-March 1951 1,843.7 
Table 26: Comparison between the rates of increase 
in net profits and wages 
I Marunouchi Shoji I Marunouchi Bussan I Ataka sangyo 
Average monthly wages: 
Oct. 1949-Mar. 1950 ¥13,824 100% ¥11,714 100% ¥12,940 100% 
Apr. 1950·Sept. 1950 14,023 101.4 12,765 109.0 13,325 102.2 
Oct. 1950-Mar. 1951 15,276 110.5 14,062 120.0 14,210 109.8 
Net profits (unit, ¥1,OOO) 
Oct. 1949-Mar. 1950 7,699 100 26,874 100 11,780 100 
Apr. 1950-Sept. 1950 20,656 269 66,200 247 60,619 515 
Oct. 1950-Mar. 1951 73,572 956 259,892 967 
In spite of the increase in the rate of profits after the war the 
wages did not show a proportionate increase, following the general rule 
of the capitalistic production system. 
As seen in Table 26 the wages increased but 1.2 times dUring the 
one year from March 1950 to March 1951 in spite of the fact that the 
net profits of all wholesalers increased 9.5 times during the same period. 
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3. Concentration of wholesalers and their relations with makers 
. As mentioned before, the share ownership of wholesalers is less 
concentrated than that of manufacturers. The business· volume of 
wholesalers, too, is less concentrated than that of manufacturers. 
In fiscal 1949 the rate of concentration in the production of manu-
facturers was: 
Pig iron: 100 p~r cent by Yawata and two others. 
Steel ingot: 81 per cent by Yawata and five others. 
Ordinary steel materials: 68 per cent by Yawata and five others. 
The rate of business concentration among wholesalers was, as 
shown in Table 15, 27.1 pC!r cent into the five major companies and 
44.6 per cent into the .. big 10 ". Although the rate is low compared 
with that of manufacturers, the major wholesalers are in a definitely 
superior position compared with medium and small wholesalers or agents. 
As to the business relations between wholesalers and manufacturers, 
Iwai Sangyo bUy3 the entire amount of pig iron, 67 per cent of steel 
materials, . and 97 per cent of wire rod from the Nippon hon Manu-
facturing Co.* Nissho, too, purchases the bulk of pig iron, bar steel, 
wire rod, etc. from the Nippon Iron Manufacturing Co. and the Kobe 
Steel Manufacturing Co., two of the" Big Five ". 
The major wholesalers specializing in iron and steel, such as Osaka 
Kozai and Nippon Tekko Kogyo, also have the greatest amount of 
business with the Nippon Iron Manufactring Co. though the percentage 
is less. 
The same thing can be said from the standpoint of manufacturers 
as well. The accompanying table shows the quota and actual sales 
of the Yawata Iron Manufacturing Co. to various wholesalers: 
(unit, ¥l-million) 





Iwai Sangyo 550 410 
Ataka Sangyo 550 500 
Muromachi Bussan 380 380 
Hitomaru Sangyo 370 3S0 
Kinoshita Shoten 180 170 
Iida-Takashimaya 190 150 
Osaka Kozai ISO 130 
Nippon Tekko 120 120 
Okaya Koki 40 35 
MaruDouchi Shoji 20 20 
Morioka Kogyo 40 39 
Nissho 50 30 
86 S. SUZUKI 
Note: *The Nippon Iron Manufacturing Co. as divided into two companies, the Yawata 
Iron Manufacturing Co. and the Fuji Iron Manufacturing Co., on April 1, 1950, in accordance 
with an order based on tne Anti-Excessive Economic Concentration Law. 
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Table 28: Suppliers to Iwai and Nisslw and the 
percentages of purchases 
Item 
Pig iron 
Steel materials and 
semi-finished steel 
Wire rod 
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Table 29: Business relations of Osaka Kozai (From April to March 1950) 
R,elation with producers 
I 
I 
Percentage in total 
amount of 
Item Main supplier Quantity Value actions 
Quantity I 
Steel materials Nippon Seitetsu 51,370 tons ¥654,854 34.9 
.. 
Kokko Seisa 9,910 121,236 6.7 
.. 
Kawasaki Seitetsu 8,956 163,362 6.1 
.. Amagasaki Seiko 7,580 100,201 5.2 
.. Daido Kohan 6,584 120,009 4.5 
.. Daiwa Seiko 5,124 50,470 3.5 
.. Tokai Kogyo 3,860 58,987 2.6 
.. Nippon Kokan 2,340 43,289 1.6 
.. Nichia Seiko 2,180 43,638 1.5 
.. Others 13,636 166,963 9.3 
Semi-finished steel Nippon Seitetsu 15,905 224,315 10.8 
.. Tosa Denki 2,779 32,874 1.9 
Pig iron products Nippon Seitetsu 16,815 91,923 11.4 
Ohters - 46,183 -
Total 147,004 I 1,918,304 100.0 
( 3) Actual conditions and problems of agents 



















The agents which had long been in existence, though suffering from 
changes in the economic conditions, as selling' organs acting as cells in 
the distribution mechanism catering to many medium and small-scale 
industries, were dealt a crushing blow following the outbreak of the 
Pacific War. 
The majority of them were forced to suspend business or change 
their lines of business due to the strengthening of Government control 
and the readjustment of enterprises. 
With the removal of wartime control and the abolition of the 
enterprise readjustment policy after the war, however, the agents began 
to revive. In 1946 they already numberd twice as many as at the time 
of the enforcement of the enterprise readjustment policy. 
1941 
1942 
Revival of agents 
Before enterprise readjustment 
After enterprise readjustment 
1,900 
700 
1946 After the War 1,478 
The SUdden revival of agents immediately after the war, however, 
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of civilian demand as to the unlawful disposal of the so~alled "Stock 
goods ", including special goods, arms and concealed goods, at the time 
of confusion right after the war, which enabled them to carryon business. 
Up to around 1949 the amounts of iron and steel products sold by 
makers to wholesalers and then by wholesalers to agents were very 
small. The commissions obtainable through the transactions therefore 
were not large enough to sustain, to say nothing of promote, the business 
of the agents which had suddenly increased. 
Viewed in this light, most of the agents which revived after the 
war were a sort of brokers until around 1949. The subsequent increase 
in production and the dearth of stock, however, cau£ed the agents to 
fulfil their original role. Meanwhile, those agents whose existence had 
depended solely on the broker business gradually went out of existence. 
Thus the agents which numbered 1,478 in 1946 decreased to 1,154 
by April 1950, whereas in the same period the number of wholesalers 
increased from 58 to 174. 
The increase of wholesalers is due to the increase in the quantity 
of goods sold by makers to wholesalers along with the increase in 
production. FGr instance, the sales of ordinary steel materials from 
makers to wholesalers, which amounted to 406,928 tons in 1947, increased 
to 2,326,841, or more than five times, in 1950. 
The quantity handled by agents was, however, very small as 
compared with the total shipillents of iron and steel. The quantity of 
ordinary steel materials handled by agents and small brokers in 1950 
accounted for only 8.1 per cent of the total shipments of ordinary steel 
rna terials by manufacturers. 
2. Present Conditions of Agents 
It is very difficult to know the present conditions of many agents 
which are scattered all over the country. 
Inasmuch as there are not enough data and the investigation is 
insufficient, as mentioned in the foreword, it is practically impossible 
to grasp the actual situation. Suffice it, therefore, to give a general 








It is more appropriate to call this 
firm a semi·wholesaler·semi·agent, for it 
buys galvanized iron sheets directly from 
makers, although it purchases steel 
materials from the Iwai Sangyo, of which 
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it is an agent. The firm is engaged also in export trade which an 
ordinary agent does not carry out. 
As to the sales of steel materials, the firm sells the products to 
consumers at prices fixed by the makers in case the sales are" with 
strings attached" and the selling prices include commissions. The 
commissions are halved by the firm and the Iwai Sangyo. 
In case the sales are" with no strings attached ", the firm is in the 
position of a buyer from the wholesaler (Iwai Sangyo) even if the 
quotation includes commission. It buys therefore from the wholesaler 
even at a price higher than the designated quotaticn if the market 
situation is favorable. 
There are many firms like this particular one which act as an agent 









Asano Bussan and 
Osaka Kozai_ 
The firm deals mainly in steel 
shapes. The transactions amo-
unted to ¥ 2,500,000 during the 
period from January to March 
1951. For both buying and selling 
operations the firm uses it own 
capital as a rule. The firm borrows 
money from banks on the security 
of deposits, materials and facilities as well as on commercial bills. 
The loans on commercial bills are, however, limited in amounts, while 
those on the security of deposits, materials and facilities are almost 
nil at present. 
In order to assure a 
company offers different 
paying in bills. 
smooth revolution of funds. therefore, the 
prices for buyers paying in cash and those 
The firm has almost no direct transactions with makers, buying 
almost entirely through wholesalers. The formulas of business connection 
with different wholesalers are not necessarily uniform. 
Firm C 
Lecation: Osaka City. 
Capital: Unknown. 
SUppliers: Muromachi Bussan 
and Tominaga Bussan 
The firm mainly deals in galva-
nized iron sheets and steel sheets. 
Besides the above-mentioned two 
wholesalers, which are the main 
suppliers, the firm is said to be 
buying also from small makers 
directly. The direct transactions are. however, limited to the caEes 
where the firm is asked by makers to sell their products. 
The firm in the past often asked makers to process galvanized iron 
sheets but it is said that the firm has ceased to do so recently because 
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this is no longer profitable. 
Like Firm B this firm's transactions are carried out almost entirely 
in cash. Its loans are not sizeable as it operates its business almost 
entirely with its own capital. 
A rough conclusion which can be derived from the above few 
examples is that the purchases from wholesalers via regular routes and 
the sales of the goods thus purchased have come to occupy the bulk 
of the agents' business of late. 
The fact that they are thus gradually getting rid of the broker· 
like character has made their business conditions unfavorable in general. 
The agents have been opening the way to gain profits by making the 
most of small price advances or declines Or through precessing or stock 
manipulation. 
Financially,' it is difficult to obtain bank loans so that the agents 
are compelled to carryon business almost entirely with their own capital. 
Due to the recent instability of the market conditions, agents except 
those whose relations with wholesalers are normal seem to be gradually 
going out of' existence. 
Is it not the case, however, that the agents, which are like calls 
in the commercial world, always have a means to sustain themselves 
one way or another by functioning as quasi·brokers? 
III. Characteristics Of Postwar Distribution Structure 
It is believed that the de£cription in Chapter II will have given 
the reader an outline of the characteristics of the postwar distribution 
system. The present chapter will present a general view of the subject 
by amplifying the de£cription in the preceding chapter. 
What can be mentioned first of all as a characteristic of the post· 
war distribution system is the comparative decline in the position of 
wholesalers against makers. They have turned into modern commercial 
capitalists (who merely receive commissions from makers). 
One of the reasons for the. change in their position is an increase 
in the number of wholesalers out of proportion to the makers' output. 
There were 54 wholesalers in 1937 when the pig iron and steel output 
totaled 13-million tons. In spite of the fact that the pig iron and steel 
output in 1946, totaling 1-million tons, was less than eight per cent of 
1937's, the wholesalers numbered 58 in that year, the number being 
larger than in 1937. 
In 1950 when the output considerably increased to 10'million tons, 
approaching the 1937. figUre, the increase in the number of wholesalers 
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was more spectacular, reaching 174, or about three times that of 1937. 
As an inevitable result, competition among wholesalers in their 
business with makers became intensified, leading to the sUbordination 
of wholesalers to makers and giving wholesalers the character of modern 
commercial capitalists who merely buy and sell goods produced by 
makers. 
The second and third reasons, which are similar to the first in 
nature, are the establishment of new firms and the low degree of 
Wholesalers' concentration compared with that of makers. We shall 
not, however, delve further into this problem here, for mention has 
already been made about it before. 
The. fourth reason is the severe loss suffered by the wholesalers' 
capital and the dearth of their own capital due to the extreme state 
control dUring the Pacific War and the defeat in war. The paucity of 
capital made it impossible for the wholesalers to extend financial aid 
to makers, whereas in the past the financial aid was a big factor that 
enabled the wholesalers to maintai~ a SUperior position. 
These were the four main factors that placed the wholesalers in 
a subordinate position, turning them into modern commercial capitalists. 
What can be cited as another characteristic of the postwar distri-
bution system was the subordination of wholesalers to banking capital. 
This trend is seen in two phenomena. One of them is the increase of 
wholesalers' bank loans and the other is the advent of banks as the 
wholesalers' major shareholders. These phenomena of course resulted 
from the dearth of wholesalers' capital. 
The third characteristic is that the wholesalers are not only subordi-
nate to domestic makers and banking capital but also are controlled 
by foreign merchants through foreign trade. 
Before the war the wholesalers had many branch and sub-branch 
offices abroad. Those in Asian colonies, in p3rticular, served as collecting 
organs for the enormous excess profits cleared by the wholesalers in 
these regions. 
With their position reversed after the war, they are now subjected 
to the extraction of excess profits by foreign merchants. 
In the case of the iron and steel trade, foreign merchants are 
gaining excess prOfits through the collection of high rreightage made 
feasible by the control of shipping instead of directly participating in 
Jap,mese trade. 
(Note: Foreign merchants handled 5.4 per cent of Japan's iron and steel export during 
fisica! 1949) 
Eighty per cent of ships engaged in Japanese trade are foreign 
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vessels which charge exorbitant freightage. Their rate is so high that 
Hailan coal carried by foreign ship3 costs almost twice as high as the 
same coal transPorted by Japanese vessels. 
The freightage further rose following the outbreak of the Korean 
War. By February 1951 the average rate of advance in world freight age 
had reached 260 per cent according to a Ministry of Transportation 
survey. In spite of such favorable conditions for foreign merchants and 
foreign transportation companies all that the Japanese wholesalers 
engaging in the trade received was a commission at a fixed percentage 
of the FOB price. 
Putting aside the third characteristic, what the first and second 
characteristics indicate is the modernization of wholesalers. For this 
an annotation is necessary. 
By the modernization of wholesalers we do not merely mean the 
replacement of wholesalers of long standing with newly established ones 
having modern character. As mentioned in (1) of this chapter, leading 
old wholesalers have a position superior to newly established wholesalers 
or medium and s.nall wholesalers" both in domestic and foreign trans-
actions. In this sense the" modm-nized redressing of old wholesalers" 
may be a better expression that the" modernization of wholesalers ". 
An annotation is necessary also on what .. modernized redressing" 
actually means. With regard to personnel, for instance, there has been 
little change after the war. In the case of Iwai Sangyo, Muromachi 
Bussan and other wholesalers, the postwar presidents and directors were 
directors or those who held similar posts during or before the war. 
Nor was there any serious effect Upon wholesalers as a result of 
the enforcement of a series of postwar laws and ordinances aimed at 
economic reform after the war,· including the Anti-Zaibatsu Ordinance, 
Economic Decentralization Law and Anti-Monopoly Law. 
It was only Mitsui Bussan and the Mitsubishi Shoji which were 
designated as special companies and ordered to disband. All others 
were immune from the above-mentioned laws and ordinances. Moreover, 
the successors to Mitsui Bussan and the Mitsubishi Shoji held a pre-
dominant position in the subsequent iron and steel transactions as 
mentioned before. 
Lastly, it may be necessary to mention that despite the above-
mentioned change in their character after the war, the iron and steel 
wholesalers continue to be indisPensable to the iron and steel distri-
bution system in this country. 
This characteristic is not a postwar phenomenon. It has been a 
characteristic that the wholesalers have had continually since before 
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the war. 
From the days of the Yawata Iron Works and the Joint Selling 
Association up untill the wartime control period, the wholesalers 
continually disposed of up to 80 to 90 per cent of the makers' iron 
and steel products as the latter's selling and buying organs though 
they underwent some changes in their character at different times. 
The explanation for this relationship between makers and whole· 
salers may be given by the fact that the Japanese iron and steel 
industry depend on wholesalers regarding operations in the distribution 
field from its very beginning. The wholesalers' position has undergone 
no change after the war. 
As seen in Table 31 the wholesalers in Japan continue to dispose 
of more than 80 per cent of the output, or not much different from 
the prewar percentage, while in the United States the corresponding 
percentage is only about 20 per cent with the quantity handled by 
dealers decreasing annually and direct sales by makers increasing on 
the other hand. 
Table 30: Export and import cargoes carried by foreign 
and Japanese ships and their percentages 
(Unit, 1,000 freight tons) 
Foreign ships Japanese ships 
Year Export and I Percentage Export and I Percentage 





1946 1,249 45.3 1,511 54.7 
1947 4,418 67.2 2,129 32.8 
1948 6,843 75.4 2,231 24.6 
1949 11,888 88.3 1,577 11.7 
1900 10,800 802 2,672 19.8 
Note: Figures for 1950 are for the first 11 months. 
Source: Ministry of Transportation survey. 
Total 













Table 31: Proportion of wholesalers' handlings and makers' 
direct sales in Japan and the United States 
Japan u. s. A. 
Wholesalers' Makers' Total Brokers' Makers' 
handlings dir€ct Wholesalers' direct Total 
and dealers' 
sales handlings sales 
1947 78.0% 22.0% 100% 26.6% 73.4% 100% 
1948 84.0 16.0 100 17.3 82.7 100 
1949 85.9 14.1 100 17.1 82.9 100 
1950 82.2 17.8 100 
- -
-
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(Note) Japan ... Comparison of wholesalers' handlings and makers' direct sales of 
ordinary steel materials based on an investigation by the Kozai Club. 
U.S.A .... Comparison of brokers', wholesalers' and dealers' handlings and 
makers' direct sales of steel materials appearing in the January 2, 
1950, issue of the magazine Steel. 
SUPPELEMENT: Actual conditions of supply and demand and changes 
in prices 
As is well known, before the end of the war and especially during 
the war, the demand for iron and steel was almost monopolized by the 
military and the Government_ 
After the defeat in war the production decreased, while the demand 
was switched from military and Government to civilian circ!es. Although 
the civilian demand was only 1.9 per cent of the total in 1942 and as 
small as 0.1 per cent in 1944, the bulk of the demand except that of 
the Occupation forces and requirements for communications and electric 
industry came from civilian circles after the war. 
As for the demand from abroad, the iron and steel exports remained 
inactive after the war until about 1949. At the end of 1949 the balance 
of the postwar iron and steel trade stood at $ 47-miIlion against Japan. 
The excess of imports alone was 1.5 times as large as exports. 
The destinations of Japanese iron and steel exports changed consider-
ably after the war with the United States and Australia coming to the 
fore. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, however, China, 
which was one of the principal destinations before the war, assumed 
a leading position both as an exporter and an importer. The steel 
materials export including primary and secondary products to China 
during November 1950 amounted to 30,000 tons, or 2.5 times the ship-
ments to the United States totaling 12,000 tons and nearly 40 per cent 
of the total export. On the other hand the import of Hailan coal 
accounted for 60 per cent of the total coal import. However, the 
Korean War, which had served as a means to solve the business depres-
sion that started toward the end of 1949, caused the resumed trade 
with China to stop again. 
The special procurement demand is, needless to say, the demand 
for materials directly necessary for the prosecution of the Korean War. 
It was different in character from ordinary export as it took the form 
of domestic sales. 
As the appearance of the special procurement demand coincided 
with the business depression and the abolition of the steel materials 
subsidy, it was welcomed like rain in the dry weather. With the 
advent of special procurement orders as a turning point, business 
conditions became active, favored by the worldwide armament expansion. 
The increase in exports was especially conspicuous. 
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Table 32: Proportion of military demand during the war 
I 1942 I 1943 I 1944 
Army, Navy, Air Force 45.7 45.4 39.6 
Shipbuilding 10.3 21.8 35.5 
Production increase, Government 142 14.6 12.8 demand 
Total 70.2 81.8 87.9 
Civilian demand 1.9 0.4 0.1 
Export, others I 27.9 I 17.8 I 12.0 
Table 33: Special procurement orders and shipments 
Comparison 
Special Shipments of shipments 
Total output procurement on special on special 
orders procurement procurement 
orders order with 
total output 
July 233,368 tons 36,390 tons 32 tons 0.013% 
August 246,992 67,538 10,443 422 
September 267,778 17,489 36,743 13.72 
October 318,913 6,721 24,104 7.56 
November 319,652 14,737 17,334 5.42 
Total 1,386,703 142,875 88,530 6.38 
Table 35: Export of iron and steel and products thereof 
I China I 
Southern I u. s. A- I Australia I Others regions 
Average for 1927-1929 I 88.5 I 2.5 I -. I - -
Average for 1930-1934 I 81.3 10.6 I I - - -
I 







.. Note: China includes Manchuna. Southern regIOns Include Slam, the PhIlIpPInes, 
the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. 
Source: Page 8 of Mr. Ichikawa's" Iron and Steel lnduttry in Crisis" for 
1927-1936. The Asahi Economic Year Book for 1949. 
Up until July 1950 when the official prices of steel materials were 
abolished, there were official producer and conSUmer prices as well as 
officially set amounts of subsidy. Table 36 shows the changes of these 
rates for pig iron, steel bar and steel sheet. 
I 
Table 31: Shipments of steel materials prices for different destinations (Based on Kozai Club survey) 
-" 
1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 I 1948 1949 
Destination Quantity Per- Quantity Per- Quantity Per- Quantity Per- Quantity Per- I Quantity Per- Quantity Per-
centage centage centage centage centage centage centage 
Occupati on forces 
- - - -
570 0.3 53,000 12.1 95,556 18.4 69,488 6.3 10.471 0.6 
Export 
- -
- - - -
3,338 0.76 6,203 1.2 39,951 3.6 102.538 5.5 
Land transportation 158,446 6.9 138,498 9.0 58,760 33.2 51,414 11.7 38,492 7.4 128,803 11.7 169,401 9.1 
Shipping, 
Ware housing - - - - - - 15,197 3.4 8,666 1.7 17,246 1.6 21.846 1.2 
Communications 234 0.01 126 0.08 1,623 0.9 3,411 0.7 7,435 1.4 13,840 1.2 6,657 0.3 
Electricity 18,201 0.79 3,886 025 366 02 2,286 0.5 8,916 1.7 25,775 2.3 18,265 0.9 
Coal 38,648 1.6 11,671 0.7 2,574 1.4 70,417 16.1 55,685 10.7 97,235 8.9 83,442 4.5 
Gas and coke 3,092 0.1 1,232 0.08 585 0.3 775 0.17 1,002 0.2 2,136 02 12,341 0.7 
Iron and steal 274,930 11.0 88,795 5.7 4,075 2.3 57,634 13.1 74,905 14.4 146,260 13.3 428,756 23.0 
Mining, 23.359 1.0 18,826 1.2 3,799 2.1 metal refining - - 7,981 1.5 12,042 1.1 14,130 0.8 
Ships 985,982 43.0 939,566 61.0 21,371 12.0 7,530 1.7 20,913 4.0 70,313 6.4 206,572 11.1 
Machinery 214,700 9.3 110,059 7.1 7,657 4.3 14,612 3.3 24,661 4.7 91,115 8.4 206,182 11.0 
Chemical fertilizer 238 0.01 4,600 02 148 0.08 30,707 7.0 11,979 2.3 14,661 1.3 27,111 1.5 
Civil engineering 2,944 0.1 186 0.01 2,079 1.1 4,e62 1.1 5,776 1.1 15,678 1.5 38,877 2.1 
Raw materials for 381,284 16.0 150,908 9.8 37,701 21.3 EO,217 11.4 59,847 11.6 156,200 142 259,225 13.9 manufacturing 
Others 190,193 8.0 69,928 4.5 35,338 20.0 70,252 16.0 83 17.7 196,669 18.0 257,289 18.8 






519,703 100.0 1 1,097,402 100.0 1 1,863,103 100.0 
--
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Table 36: Iron and steel official prices (Unit, Yen per ton) 
I 
Mar. I 1946 MYIJ_I~I~'IJ=IJu~I~I~I~' 1947 1948 1949 1900 1951, 1952 1953 1954 1955 
! 
A 1,186 6,750 15,080 13,200 17,000 18,360 17,730 i 16,300 20,300 
Pig iron 1,300 3,050 3,600 3,600 7,400 9,750 16,600 Free B 11,880 I 12,600 Price 
C - 3,700 11,480 9,600 9,600 8,610 5,850 : 3,700 3,700 
A 2,371 10,510 21,300 19,360 I 23,000 25,540 
Steel bar B 2,600 5,990 10,120 10,120 13,760 18,000 Free price 19mm 
C 
-
4,520 11,180 9,240 9,240 7,540 
, 
A 3,429 15,270 ' 30,160 27,220 32,790 33,540 
Steel sheet B 3,030 8,690 14,690 14,690 20,260 25,940 Free price 
11.6 mm 
C - 6,580 15,470 12,520 12,530 7,600 I 
Note: A. Producer price. B. Consumer price. C. Subsidy 
The market prices temporarily advanced early in 1949 but began 
falling later. The fall became sharper toward the end of 1949, causing 
fear about the future of the Japanese iron and steel industry, which 
had bought raw materials at high prices and whose cost of production 
was consequently high. 
The market rallied, however, from July 1950. The market prices 
for some of the products came to surpass the producer prices, to say 
nothing of the official prices. 
Since then the prices of raw materials, freight age and the prices 
of prodUcts have been generally on the upswing though there were 
temporary setbacks at times. 
Table 37: Raw materials prices, January·December, 1950 
I 
Domestic coal Chinese coal 
I 
U.S. coal (Hail an) 
January $13.50 I } February 13.50 $11.34 (average) $23.11 March 14.30 April 14.60 
May 14.20 
} June 14.40 $11.20 (average) 
July 12.40 No important 
August 14.10 I September 14.50 $11.72 (average) October November 18.00 
December 18.00 
Note: Average C.I.F. price per ton for imported coal. Average Wholesale price per 
ton for damesti c coal, 
Table 38: Producer prices and market prices of ordinary steel materials 
~ I Difference Difference I Difference 
A), between CB) between CB)lbetween CD) I and CD) and CE) and CE) __ 
Revised official Producer prices Market prices I Differenc 
Item and size consumer price of Januaury I, 1950 August I J I 15/ A 1 I A 15 I between C 
CA) shi~~)nts Company uct) ('is') '(lb and CB) 
9mm 23,500 27,000 Yawata 22,000 22,000 24,500 14.9° % -18.5% - 9,3% 11.4% 
Steel 19 18,000 24,000 sheet: .. .. 19,000 20,000 21,000 33.4 -16.7 -12.5 5.0 
50 .. 18,000 25,000 .. 18,000 18,500 19,500 38.9 -26.0 -22.0 5.4 
4x50x50 21,600 27,300 
.. 22,500 23,000 26,000 26.4 -15.8 - 5.0 13.0 
Steel 6.8x50x50 20,400 26,000 22,000 24,000 27.5 shapes: .. -15.4 - 7,7 9.1 
Over 1.00 on 20,400 27,000 19,000 one side .. 22,000 32.4 -29.6 -18.5 15.8 
029x3x6 36,700 48,000 , 53,000 55,000 58,000 30.8 14.5 20.8 3.6 
Steel 0.40 x .. 34,100 43,500 .. 40,000 43,000 27.6 - 8.0 - 1.1 7.5 
sheet: 0.50 x 30,700 39,000 32,000 .. .. 34,500 36,000 27,0 -11.5 - 7.7 4.3 
12.025 X ,. 25,940 32,000 .. 30,000 30,000 36,000 23.4 - 6.2 12.5 20.0 
32x3x6 25,500 . 31,200 .. 31,500 33,500 34,500 22.4 4.2 10.6 6.2 
Medium 6.0x 22,300 27,900 plate: .. .. 27,500 28,000 25.1 - 1.4 0 1.8 
l.60x JI 20,200 26,000 .. 22,000 23,000 23,500 28.7 -11.5 - 9.6 2.2 
029x3x6 209 275 Daido 290 
Galvanized 
290 300 31.6 5.5 9.0 3.4 
iron 0.40 x .. 275 310 .. 
sheet: 
310 320 330 12.7 3.2 6.5 3.1 
0.50 x .. 315 340 .. 340 340 345 7,9 0 0 0 
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Table 39: Producer prices of ordinary steel materials 
(Based on Kozai Club Survey) 
1950 1951 
Item and size 
I I I Mar. I I I Aug. Oct. Dec. Jan. May July Sept. 
Bar 24,000 25,000 27,000 29,000 32,500 43,000 49,000 49,000 
Structural steel 26,000 27,000 29,200 31,800 34,500 47,500 53,200 53,200 
Rail 30,000 30,000 30,000 32,500 36,500 89,000 55,000 55,000 
Wire rod 25,000 27,600 29,000 31,000 36,000 52,000 58,000 58,000 
PI {3.2X3X6 31,200 32,200 34,300 36,000 43,700 55,200 61,900 61,900 
ate 12-25 26,000 27,000 28,500 30,500 35,500 46,000 51,500 51,500 
S {0.29X3X6 48,000 49,500 54,000 57,000 68,600 89,000 95,000 95,000 heet 
1.6x3X6 32,000 33,000 36,000 38,000 48,000 65,000 75,000 75,000 
Tin plate 0.228 X 20 x 28 88,800 94,300 102,430 112,110 129,630 163,960 184,230 184,230 
High-class finish 45,600 48,500 51,300 55,100 69,300 82,500 104,800 104,800 
ST [T.120 class 67,200 70,500 76,000 81,800 93,000 122,700 138,000 138,000 
I ICOn steel 
50,000 50,000 54,000 57,000 67,000 85,700 94,000 94,000 B. class 
Hoop 29,000 31,700 34,700 38,000 45,000 60,000 68,000 
Gas pipe 17,330 18,700 19,350 20,800 25,970 31,460 34,090 
Billet 19,000 19,000 22,000 24,000 27,000 38,000 I 43,000 
Sheet bar 21,500 24,000 28,500 30,000 35,000 48,000 52,500 
Note: Fuji Seitetu's prices for semi-finished products anp hoop, Nippon Kokan's price 







Rank of Hill 6 M:lkers in J:lpan Iron & Steel production (1948) 


















181.899 365,332 115.398 
110,742 496,1.48 ]99,584 137,687 
43,601 261,263 163,683 54.280 
Abbreviation 
Azuma Steel Co., Ltd. 
Amagasaki Steel Works,. Ltd. 
Fuji Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 
Kawasaki Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 
Kokura Steel Co., Ltd. 
Kobe Steel Works, Ltd. ; .~ 
Nippon Steel Tube Co., Ltd. 
Nakayama Steel Works, Ltd. 
Nippon Steei Works, Ltd. 
Shinfuso Metal Industry Co., Ltd. 
Toto Steel Co., Ltd. 
Yawata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 
Yodogawa Steel Works, Ltd. 
662,629 ~2.629 " 100 
129.653 105.943 1,179,757 1.714.676 68"' 
91.086 86.708 700.622 1.200,201 5R5 
F. J. S., kamais'hi 0 
K I. S. A 
K S" 
E. IS .. hlrohara 0 
F. J. S .. kawasaki 
xO 
A 
0: Pig Iron by Blast Furnace and Steel Ingot 
A: Steel Ingot for Rolling by Open Hearth and Converter 
0: Steel Ingot for Rolling by Electric Furnace and Converter 
X: Other Rollecl Steel 
o 
o 
x 
